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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, the validity evaluation method of free allocation is studied under the
background of allocating the total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC). First,
the free allocation method’s localization and players’ strategic behaviors are analyzed.
Second, an incentive mechanism for allocating TPPDC is proposed based on the uniform
price auction of divisible goods, and an evaluationmodel to evaluate the validity for the free
allocation of TPPDC is established, and the feasibility and reasonableness of this evaluation
model are proved. Third, the evaluation criterion and the evaluation process are given.
Finally, this evaluation model is applied to the environmental planning of Han River basin,
and the validity evaluation result of free allocation is obtained by analyzing the statistical
data of chemical oxygen demand (COD) in 14 counties and cities of Hubei Province,
China. The results of our study will provide the government environmental management
departments with theoretical basis and scientific methods to effectively implement the
pollutant gross control system and design the related environmental policies.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC) is a special scarce resource. The fairness and effectiveness
of allocating the TPPDC are the basis of pollutant gross control, pollution treatment and environmental sustainable
development. A fair and reasonable allocation method will help to stimulate the polluters to treat the pollution actively
and to curb the self-serving behaviors of the environmental protection departments. Especially, it will provide valuable
theoretical reference and methodological guidance for making relevant environmental policies in the environmental
planning [1].
In China, because the Pollutant Gross Control (PGC) system starts late, the relevant policies, rules andmarkets are not yet
mature, the environmental monitoring and statistical information are incomplete, and regional development is unbalanced,
thus the environmental management department usually uses the free allocation method to allocate the TPPDC. This free
allocation method is simple and feasible, and also maneuverable. It aims to achieve the lowest-cost of pollution control
among control areas. For the actual needs of environmental planning in China, Wang et al. [2] proposes a free allocation
method to allocate the TPPDC by introducing equal-fight function and equal-fight discharges. Li and Chou [3] discuss the
complexity for the pricing problem of TPPDC on the view of the multiplicity of environmental value. Chen and Hou [4]
propose a multiple-person cooperation game model to the optimal treatment cost allocation. Yang and Fu [5] develop
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a punishment model by using a decision tree with asymmetry information to analyze the strategy options between the
supervisor and the subordinates. They conclude that the supervisor can restrict the self-reporting performance from the
subordinates based on a cost and benefit analysis so that the pollution load report information is more rational. These
methods are proposed based on the conditions of non-perfect competition and perfect information.
However, TPPDC is a kind of divisible goods and resource (which means one unit good can be divided into many smaller
units. For example, stocks, treasury bills and spectrum besides TPPDC, are all divisible goods). It involves very complicated
game in the allocation of TPPDC. Here, every polluter’s declared information is his private information in essence, and it is
also unsymmetrical. So the facticity of the information cannot be guaranteed. These factors will cause people to doubt on
the effectiveness and feasibility of the free allocation method. Therefore, how to measure and evaluate the validity degree
of the free allocation scheme and how to propose other newmethods to allocate TPPDC are two problems which are worth
studying in environmental planning.
Some studies have demonstrated that public auction and sale on wances are two efficient methods to allocate TPPDC.
Economists suggest that the allocation methods by using auction can realize the effectiveness of resource allocation and
social welfare optimization [6]. For example, the US EPA just uses the standard sealed-bid auction with the discriminatory
price to allocate SO2 emission rights. In the actual studies and applications, the uniform price or discriminatory price is
a focus of controversy in the studies of auction methods for allocating the TPPDC. Cason and Plott [7] point out that the
discriminatory auction will lead to great deviation of price signals and reduce the efficiency of emissions trading markets,
but the uniform price auction can provide more accurate price information. Svendsen and Christensen [8] also analyze
the disadvantages in the discriminatory price auction of SO2 emission rights, and they conclude that the uniform price
auctionmay provide better price signals. Cramton and Kerr [9] study the carbon permit auction, and show that the standard
ascending-clock auction will provide credible prices, which is better than the uniform price auction. Based on the policy
frame work and theoretical as well as experimental findings in the literature, an ascending clock auction format was
proposed by Betz [10] and later proposed by the Australian government in their White Paper (Commonwealth of Australia
2008). Cason [11] reviews specific experimental applications that address design issues for permit auction rules, permit
expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement. Goeree et al. [12] experimentally study auctions
versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spotmarket. However,
these research findings are attached with certain conditions and certain limitations. If these conditions or limitations are
unsatisfied, then the corresponding conclusions need to be reconsidered. For example, most auction methods of allocating
the TPPDC are presented by the means of indivisible goods auctions, or the uniform price auctions with special conditions
(such as secret reserve price). The auction methods which aim at the TPPDC with the characteristics of homogeneousness
and divisibility are few.
Essentially, the objective of the free allocation method for allocating the TPPDC is accordant with the auction method,
that is to achieve efficient allocation of resources and to minimize the total cost of pollution treatment or to maximize the
social welfare. Therefore, we can design a group of conditions to establish two similar mathematical models according to
the same objective for the free allocationmethod and auctionmethod, and then use the allocation results of auctionmethod
to analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation. To a certain extent, the evaluation result may reflect the
reasonableness and stimulation of the current pollutant gross control system in China.
To date, Operational Research has beenusefully applied to awide variety of environmental problemareas includingwater
resources management, water quality management, solid wastes operation and design, cost allocation for environmental
facilities, and air qualitymanagement [13,14]. Therefore, in this paper, we regard the TPPDC as a homogeneous and divisible
good, and the declared marginal cost as the polluters’ private information. Then, based on the theories and methods of
operations research (OR), we propose a uniform price auction model of divisible goods with elastic supply to allocate
TPPDC, and then analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC. We also discuss and analyze the
reasonableness and feasibility of this evaluation model, and apply it to do a case analysis for the environmental planning
of Han River in Hubei province, China. Then we obtain the evaluation results of validity for the free allocation scheme of
allocating the chemical oxygen demand (COD).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the free allocation method’s limitations and the plays’
strategic behaviors. Section 3 proposes an incentive mechanism for allocating TPPDC based on the uniform price auctions
of divisible goods, and establishes a validity evaluation method to analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free
allocation of TPPDC. Section 4 discusses and analyzes the reasonableness and feasibility of this evaluation model. Section 5
proposes the evaluation criterion and gives the evaluation steps to show how to apply our evaluationmodel. Section 6 gives
a model application in the environmental planning of Han River basin. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2. Free allocation analysis of TPPDC
To begin, some important assumptions are given to describe the problemof allocating TPPDC. It is supposed that there is a
quantityQ0 of TPPDC to be allocated for n polluters. For the polluter i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the actual pollutant discharge capacity
is denoted as Gi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and the declared marginal cost function of pollution treatment (hereinafter referred to as
marginal cost) is denoted as gi(x), where gi(x) ≥ 0. The environmental management department (hereinafter referred to as
the assigner) will allocate permitted pollution discharge capacity qi to the polluter i according to the declared information
(g1, g2, . . . , gn) and (G1,G2, . . . ,Gn) by all polluters. Thus, the surplus pollutant which the polluter i should treat himself
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can be denoted as x = Gi−qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let the cost function of treating surplus pollutant x = Gi−qi of the ith polluter
be Fi(x). Then the marginal cost gi (x) = dFi(x)dx ≥ 0, which means the cost of pollution treatment rises as the treating surplus
pollutant capacity x rises.
The allocation of TPPDC, Q0, may be described by
∑n
i=1 qi = Q0, where 0 ≤ qi ≤ Gi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Nowadays, the free
allocation method is mostly used to allocate the TPPDC in China. The objective of this method is to minimize the total cost
of pollution treatment or to maximize the social welfare by determining an allocative decision under a uniform marginal
cost. Concretely, the allocation model can be expressed as
Min
n−
i=1
Fi(Gi − qi)
s.t.

n−
i=1
qi = Q0
gi (Gi − qi) = p, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
0 ≤ qi ≤ Gi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(M1)
The allocation results by using the free allocation method described by Model (M1) are based on the polluters’ declared
marginal cost gi(x) and the actual pollutant discharge capacity Gi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If the polluters’ declared information
is just their actual information, then the Model (M1) describes an ordinary problem of resource allocation. The allocation
result shows that the polluter with great declared marginal cost gi(x) gets more permitted pollution discharge capacity qi,
but the polluter with small declared marginal cost gi(x) gets less permitted pollution discharge capacity qi [15]. Under the
condition of perfect information, this free allocation method can minimize the pollution control cost among control areas
and maximize the social efficiency of pollutant gross allocation. To some extent, it is reasonable.
However, the polluter i’s declared marginal cost gi(x) and the actual pollutant discharge capacity Gi are the polluter i’s
private or partially private information. So the facticity of this information cannot be guaranteed. In Model (M1), since the
polluter with great declared marginal cost gi(x) gets more permitted pollution discharge capacity qi, so the free allocation
method will encourage polluters to exaggerate their marginal costs. In practical free allocation of TPPDC, how to reflect the
facticity and reliability of polluters’ declared information? And how to measure the validity degree of the free allocation?
These two key problems cannot be solved inModel (M1). Therefore, wemust seek reasonablemethods ormeans tomeasure
the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC.
3. Validity evaluation model for free allocation of TPPDC
For the polluter i, Fi(Gi) is endogenous and fixed. Thus, the objective of Model (M1)may be equivalent to
Max
n−
i=1
[Fi(Gi)− Fi(Gi − qi)], (1)
where Fi(Gi) − Fi(Gi − qi) denotes the difference between the polluter i’s cost on treating the pollutant discharge capacity
Gi and Gi− qi. And it also denotes the polluter i’s income when he obtains the permitted pollution discharge capacity qi, i.e.,
Fi(Gi)− Fi(Gi − qi) =
∫ Gi
Gi−qi
gi(x)dx.
So we have
d(Fi(Gi)− Fi(Gi − qi))
dqi
= gi(Gi − qi) ≥ 0.
Therefore, if the marginal costs are unified, i.e., gi(Gi− qi) = p, then Maxqi(Fi(Gi)− Fi(Gi− qi)) is equivalent to Maxqipqi.
Thus, (1) is equivalent to Max
∑n
i=1 pqi = Max pQ0, and the Model (M1) is equivalent to the following Model (M2).
Max pQ0
s.t.

n−
i=1
qi = Q0
gi(Gi − qi) = p, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
0 ≤ qi ≤ Gi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(M2)
In Model (M2), if pqi is regarded as the polluter i’s payment to obtain the permitted pollution discharge capacity qi from
the assigner, or is seemed as the assigner’s income, and we also suppose the following.
(Assumption 1) The assigner and all polluters are risk neutral. The assigner’s supply Q0 is common knowledge.
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(Assumption 2) Let the polluter i’s actual marginal cost function be fi(x). It is private information. fi(x) is only known by
bidder i, and other bidders do not observe the realization of fi(x). Any two functions fi(x) and fj(x)with i ≠ j
are independent.
(Assumption 3) For the polluter i, the actual marginal cost function fi(x) is greater than or equal to the declared marginal
cost function gi(x). Then Model (M2) can be regarded as a uniform auction model of divisible goods, where
the assigner is the auctioneer, and the polluters are the bidders. Here, the assigner allocates TPPDC, Q0,
under a uniform price p = gi(Gi − qi), (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) in which the marginal cost gi(x) is declared by the
ith polluter. The assigner’s objective is to maximize his income, i.e., Max pQ0.
However, several studies conclude that the bidders’ collusion and low-price equilibrium will easily occur if the goods
are allocated by using the Model (M2) [15–18]. Therefore, if we use Model (M2) to allocate the TPPDC, then it does not
guarantee sufficient fairness and validity of allocation. So the assigner will not use Model (M2) to analyze and evaluate the
validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC directly. Actually, themain reasonwhich leads to bidders’ collusion and low-
price equilibrium is that the equality
∑n
i=1 qi = Q0 (the assigner’s supply Q0 is fixed) inModel (M2) restricts any decision by
the assigner. Maxp pQ0 of Model (M2) is completely determined by polluters. So, the lower the benefit to the government,
the larger the polluters’ income. Here, in order to improve assigner decisions and limit the scale of false declarations by
polluters, we will improve the condition
∑n
i=1 qi = Q0 in Model (M2).
Concretely, the fixed supply Q0 of Model (M2) can be modified as elastic supply Q (p), which means the supply has price
elasticity, or the supply can be regarded as an increasing function of price p. This is public information announced by the
assigner. Thus, the higher the price p determined by the assigner, the more the total permitted pollution discharge capacity
allocated to polluters. This strategy is an incentive strategy for the assigner to induce polluters truthfully announcing their
actual marginal costs.
The assigner’s objective is to maximize his income
∑n
i=1 pqi = pQ (p), raised from pollutants allocation by choosing an
elastic supply Q (p) ≤ Q0 and associated with a uniform price p ≥ 0. So we have
Max U = pQ (p)
S.T.

n−
i=1
qi = Q (p)
Q (p) ≤ Q0
gi (Gi − qi) = p, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
qi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(M3)
The goal of the ith polluter is to maximize his income by declaring its smart marginal cost gi(x), that is,
Max
∫ Gi
Gi−qi(p)
(fi(x)− p)dx = Max
∫ Gi
Gi−qi(p)
fi(x)dx− pqi(p).
Model (M3)describes a uniformprice auctionmodel based on elastic supply. Intuitively, the actual total allocated capacity
Q ∗ based on Model (M3) may be less than the fixed supply Q0. If the Model (M3) has the property, i.e., Q ∗ = Q0, which is
satisfied in the condition of full competition, then the difference value Q0 − Q ∗ can show the facticity and reliability of
polluters’ declared information and the validity of allocation on the view of resource allocation. Moreover, Q0 is also the
total quantity of free allocation, and the declared information to the uniform price auction method described by Model
(M3) and to the free allocation method described by Model (M1) is uniform in essence. In addition, the objective of (M3)
is accordant with the Model (M1), that is to achieve efficient allocation of resources. Thus, if the value Q0 − Q ∗ is smaller,
then the polluters’ declared information is closer to their actual marginal cost, and the validity degree of the free allocation
scheme is higher. So the actual total allocated capacity Q ∗ based on Model (M3) can be regarded as the valid allocation part
of the free allocation results, and the quantity Q0−Q ∗ is regarded as the invalid allocation part of the free allocation results.
Then we can evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC by the value H = Q∗Q0 × 100%.
In order to analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation by using Q ∗ and Q0, we must prove that Model
(M3) describes a feasible allocation method with good information stimulation.
4. Reasonableness analysis for the validity evaluation model
Concretely, when the model (M3) can be used to evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC, it must
satisfy the following three properties:
(1) First of all, the auctionmechanismdescribed by (M3) is a feasiblemechanism, i.e., (M3) can incentive polluters to declare
the actual marginal cost, and every type of polluter must receive an expected payoff at least as high as he would not
participate in the auction. This is a precondition for an auction mechanism.
(2) Second, (M3) can reflect the facticity of polluters’ declared information. In other words, if the polluters’ declared
information is not strictly true, then the actual total allocated capacity Q ∗ is less than the fixed supply Q0. Otherwise,
the actual total allocated capacity Q ∗ might be close to or achieve the fixed supply Q0.
C. Rao et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 62 (2011) 3037–3047 3041
(3) Third, the realer the declared information, the greater the actual total allocated capacity Q ∗ to the polluters, and the
smaller the value Q0 − Q ∗.
If the above three properties hold, then Q0 − Q ∗ can be used to evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation. Next
we prove the above three properties one by one.
Proposition 1. The auction mechanism described by (M3) can incentive polluter to declare the actual marginal cost.
Proof. Let p∗ and q∗i be the equilibrium price and the equilibrium allocation quantity for bidder i respectively, and Q ∗ =
Q (p∗) be an equilibrium total capacity chosen by the assigner. The allocated capacities q1, q2, . . . , qn may be regarded as
the functions of the uniform price p, where qi = Q (p)−∑nj=1
j≠i
qj and
dqi
dp ≤ 0, (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
For the polluter i, his objective is
Max ui =
∫ Gi
Gi−Q (p)+
n∑
j=1,j≠i
qj
fi(x)dx− pqi(p).
By the optimization condition, we have
∂ui
∂p

p=p∗
= ∂
∂p
∫ Gi
Gi−Q (p)+
n∑
j=1,j≠i
qj
fi(x)dx− pqi(p)


p=p∗
= 0
so
−fi(x∗i )
∂

Gi − Q (p)+
n∑
j=1,j≠i
qj

∂p

p=p∗
− q∗i − p∗
dqi
dp

p=p∗
= 0.
By simplifying the above equation, we have
−fi(x∗)
−dQ
dp
+
n−
j=1,
j≠i
∂qj
∂p


p=p∗
−q∗i − p∗
dqi
dp

p=p∗
= 0.
Namely,
q∗i = −fi(x∗i )
−dQ (p)
dp
+
 n−
j=1
j≠i
∂qj
∂p
+ dqi
dp

− dqi
dp


p=p∗
− p∗ dqi
dp

p=p∗
= −fi(x∗i )

−dQ (p)
dp
+ dQ (p)
dp

p=p∗
+ (fi(x∗i )− p∗)
dqi
dp

p=p∗
= (fi(x∗i )− p∗)
dqi
dp

p=p∗
.
Since
dqi
dp
≤ 0, q∗i ≥ 0.
So we have
fi(x∗)− p∗ ≤ 0.
Moreover, by Assumption 3, we have
p∗ ≤ fi(x∗).
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Thus
p∗ = fi(x∗i )
which means the auction mechanism described by (M3) will reach the equilibrium only when every polluter’s declared
marginal cost is equal to his actual marginal cost. Therefore, we can conclude that (M3) describes an auction mechanism
with good information stimulation. 
Proposition 2. If the auction mechanism described by (M3) is used to allocate TPPDC, then the expected utility of the polluter
who participates in the auction is nonnegative.
Proof. Because the polluter i’s income function is
ui =
∫ Gi
Gi−qi(p)
(fi(x)− p)dx =
∫ Gi
Gi−qi(p)
fi(x)dx− pqi(p).
By Assumption 3, we have
p = gi(xi) ≤ fi(xi).
Thus
ui ≥ 0,
which means every bidder must receive an nonnegative expected utility when he will participate in the auction. Therefore,
Proposition 2 was proved. 
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the auction mechanism described by (M3) is a feasible mechanism.
Proposition 3. In Model (M3), the assigner’s optimal decision will be Q ∗ = Q0.
Proof. Suppose that the equilibrium price is p∗, and an equilibrium total capacity chosen by the assigner is Q (p∗), where
Q (p∗) < Q0. If there exists a polluter i who can profit from the deviation of the equilibrium while the deviation can also
make a profit for the assigner, then the assigner and the polluters will reach their equilibrium only when Q (p∗) = Q0.
Consider the following deviation g i for polluter i:
gi(Gi − q∗i ) = g i(Gi − q∗i ) = p∗
g i(Gi − q∗i − δ) = p∗ − ε,
where ε > 0, δ > 0, and ε is small enough and satisfies ε ≤ p∗δQ∗+δ . Except polluter i, the bidding strategies of the rest n− 1
polluters keep unchanged.
On the one hand, if the assigner chooses the total capacity Q ∗ + δ, then the clearing price will be p = p∗ − ε. Since ε is
small enough, and ε ≤ p∗δQ∗+δ (i.e., δ ≥ Q
∗ε
p∗−ε ), so the assigner’s income will be
p(Q ∗ + δ) = (p∗ − ε)(Q ∗ + δ) ≥ (p∗ − ε)

Q ∗ + Q
∗ε
p∗ − ε

= p∗Q ∗
which means the assigner makes a profit.
On the other hand, since p = p∗ − ε < p∗, and the allocated capacity qi of the ith polluter satisfies qi = q∗i + δ > q∗i , so
the ith polluter’s income will be∫ Gi
Gi−qi
fi(x)dx− pqi =
∫ Gi−q∗i
Gi−qi
fi(x)dx− p(qi − q∗i )

+
∫ Gi
Gi−q∗i
fi(x)dx− pq∗i

≥
∫ Gi
Gi−q∗i
fi(x)dx− pq∗i ≥
∫ Gi
Gi−q∗i
fi(x)dx− p∗q∗i
whichmeans the ith polluter will also benefit from his smart deviation. Thus, by accumulating all players’ profits, the former
equilibrium capacity Q ∗ chosen by the assigner must increase until Q ∗ = Q0.
Proposition 3 shows that when the uniform price auction method given by (M3) is used to allocate TPPDC, the optimal
decision of the assigner will still be Q ∗ = Q0 because of all players’ utility maximization principle. Thus, this property can
be used to judge the facticity of the polluters’ declared information. When Q ∗ < Q0, it shows that the competitiveness of
bidding is not enough. Then the buyer can announce the possible allocated results to let the suppliers adjust their bids. The
polluters’ declared information is closer to their actual marginal cost when the value Q0−Q ∗ is smaller. Therefore, Q0−Q ∗
can be used to evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC on the view of stimulation. 
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Fig. 1. Sketch map of equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Suppose all polluters are risk neutral. If the polluter i changes the declared marginal cost function from gi to g ′i
(see Fig. 1). Here, the polluter’s amendedmarginal cost function should be incremental, and it is not allowed to revise downward. So
g ′i is closer to the actual marginal cost function fi(x), and the rest n−1 polluters’ declaredmarginal cost functions keep unchanged.
Then we have the following.
(i) For the polluter i, the allocated capacity q∗′i based on g
′
i is greater than or equal to the allocated capacity q
∗
i based on gi, that
is, q∗′i ≥ q∗i .
(ii) The supply capacity Q ∗′ based on g ′i is greater than or equal to the supply capacity Q ∗ based on gi, i.e., Q ∗
′ ≥ Q ∗.
Proof. For the polluter i, before he adjusts the declared marginal cost function, we suppose that the equilibrium uniform
price is p∗, his allocated permitted pollution discharge capacity is q∗i , and his treating surplus pollutant capacity is x
∗
i =
Gi − q∗i , j = 1, 2, . . . , n. After adjusting the declared marginal cost function, the polluter i’s allocated permitted pollution
discharge capacity is denoted as q∗′i , and his treating surplus pollutant capacity is denoted as x
∗′
i = Gi− q∗′i . The equilibrium
uniform price is denoted as p∗′ .
When the polluter i changes the declared marginal cost function from gi to g ′i , we suppose g
′
i satisfies
g ′i (Gi − q∗i ) = gi(Gi − q∗i ) = p∗
and g ′i is closer to his actual marginal cost. If the rest n−1 polluters’ declaredmarginal cost functions keep unchanged, then
the equilibrium price will decrease in the new equilibrium, i.e., p∗′ ≤ p∗.
From Fig. 1, we can conclude that x∗i = Gi − q∗i ≥ x∗′i = Gi − q∗′i when the declared marginal cost function is changed
from gi to g ′i . Thus, we obtain q
∗′
i ≥ q∗i .
Because the polluter k’s (k = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n) declared marginal cost functions keep unchanged, thus from
Fig. 1, we also have q∗′k ≥ q∗k , k = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n.
Since q∗′i ≥ q∗i and q∗′k ≥ q∗k ,k = 1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n, we have
Q ∗
′ = q∗′i +
n−
k=1,k≠i
q∗
′
k ≥ Q ∗ = q∗i +
n−
k=1,k≠i
q∗k
which means the supply capacity Q ∗′ based on g ′i is greater than or equal to the supply capacity Q ∗ based on gi. 
Proposition 4 shows that the auction mechanism described by (M3) has the property of bidding consistency, that is, the
realer the polluter i’s declared information, the greater the allocated permitted pollution discharge capacity to the polluter
i, and the greater the actual total allocated capacity Q ∗. This conclusion further shows that it is reasonable to evaluate the
validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC by using Q0 − Q ∗.
5. Validity evaluation process of the free allocation
From the conclusions in Section 3, we conclude that the Model (M3) is a feasible mechanism, and it can achieve the
fairness and validity of allocating the TPPDC and can reflect the facticity and reliability of polluters’ declared information.
Therefore, the Model (M3) can be directly used to analyze and evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC.
In the practical allocation of TPPDC, based on the same declared information of polluters, we can solve Models (M3) and
(M1) respectively, and then make a comparative analysis for the results. On the one hand, for any declared information of
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polluters, the quantity Q0 of TPPDCwill be entirely allocated to the polluters by using the free allocationmethod. Since there
is no stimulation in Model (M1), so the facticity of polluters’ declared information and the validity of allocation results are
not guaranteed. On the other hand, we can regard the polluters’ declared information as the bidders’ bidding information,
and then solve theModel (M3) to determine the optimal allocated capacity qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. From the stimulation ofModel
(M3) we know that if the polluters’ declared information is not strictly true, then the actual total allocated capacity Q ∗ is
less than the fixed supply Q0. And the realer the declared information is, the greater the actual total allocated capacity Q ∗
will be. Then we can evaluate the validity degree of the free allocation of TPPDC by using the difference value Q0 − Q ∗.
In addition, in practical calculation of Model (M3), the assigner’s supply Q (p) can be set as a nonlinear function, for
example, we set
∑n
i=1 qi = Q (p) = c + dp2, where c ≥ 0, d > 0. The above evaluation steps are as follows.
Step 1: Collect related data, i.e., the plan quantity Q0 of TPPDC and the polluters’ declared information (g1, g2, . . . , gn) and
(G1,G2, . . . ,Gn).
Step 2: Substitute Q0, (g1, g2, . . . , gn) and (G1,G2, . . . ,Gn) into the free allocation Model (M1), then the permitted pollution
discharge capacity q1, q2, . . . , qn are obtained by solving Model (M1).
Step 3: Substitute Q0, (g1, g2, . . . , gn) and (G1,G2, . . . ,Gn) into the auction Model (M3), then the actual total allocated
capacity Q ∗ and the permitted pollution discharge capacity q′1, q
′
2, . . . , q
′
n are obtained by solving Model (M3).
Step 4: Evaluate the validity degree of the free allocation according to the Q0 and Q ∗. The computational formulas are as
follows.
The validity degree of the free allocation is computed by
H = Q
∗
Q0
× 100%.
The invalid degree of the free allocation is computed by
H = Q0 − Q
∗
Q0
× 100%.
Generally, the greater the value of H is, the higher the validity degree of the free allocation scheme is.
6. Model application in the environmental planning of Han River basin
Han River is the largest tributary of Changjiang River, and its headwaters is Shaanxi shirakawa. Han River runs through
the territory of 14 counties and cities in Hubei Province, i.e., Shiyan, Danjiangkou, Xiangfan, Laohekou, Gucheng, Yicheng,
Jingmen, Zhongxiang, Shayang, Tianmen, Xiantao, Qianjiang, Hanchuan andWuhan, with a total length of 870 km. Han River
and its tributaries have been polluted by the domestic sewage and industrial sewage of coastal cities and countries. There
are more than 40 pollution zones in the area of these 14 counties and cities of Hubei Province, China. Every year, about
6–7 millions of tons waste water are poured into Han River. With the development of economy and society, the pollution
of Han River is becoming increasingly serious. In order to control and treat pollutant for Han River effectively, the People’s
Government of Hubei Province has taken the measure of controlling TPPDC. Since its implementation, the water pollution
of Han River has been significantly improved.
Next we will apply the Model (M3) to do a case analysis for the environmental planning of Han River basin based on the
statistical data of chemical oxygen demand (COD) in 14 counties and cities of Hubei Province during ‘‘Tenth Five-Year’’ and
‘‘Eleventh Five-Year’’. Let the optimal allocated quantity be Q ∗ by using Model (M3). Then we can compare Q ∗ with Q0 to
evaluate the validity of the free allocation of COD.
6.1. Determine the marginal cost function
In practical calculation, let the polluter i’s declared marginal cost function be gi(x) = aix + bi, where ai ≥ 0
denotes variable costs coefficient. ai is related to chemical medicine, electric cost, maintenance costs, processing level and
interrelated human resources; bi ≥ 0 denotes fixed cost coefficient. It may be determined by the construction cost and
financing cost of every city’s sewage treatment facility. bi can be calculated based on 20 years operation period depreciation.
In calculation, by analyzing and calculating the construction cost of every city’s sewage treatment facility, we can obtain
the fixed cost coefficient bi. So the fixed cost coefficient bi may be regarded as public information. The environmental
management department and polluters all know this information. Now we give the process of determining the fixed cost
coefficient bi.
Now we discuss the allocation problem of reduction chemical oxygen demand (COD) in the environmental planning of
Han River basin. According to the environmental protection ‘‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’’ of Hubei Province, China, we can
obtain the statistical data of construction cost and financing cost of 14 counties’ and cities’ sewage treatment facilities. The
data are listed in Table 1.
According to the construction cost and financing cost of the sewage treatment facility of every city and county, we
calculate bi based on 20 years operation period depreciation. Suppose each sewage treatment plant’s service life is 20 year
since 2005. The sum-of-the-years-digits depreciation method is used to calculate the yearly depreciation amount. Three
main calculation formulas of this depreciation method are as follows.
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Table 1
Sewage treatment projects of 14 counties and cities of Hubei Province during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.
Number City (or County) Reduction amount of COD (104 tons) Construction cost and financing cost (104 Yuan)
1 Wuhan City 2.61 16230
2 Danjiangkou City 0.68 6428
3 Shiyan City 2.612 16230
4 Xiangfan City 3.17 24700
5 Laohekou City 0.57 4000
6 Gucheng County in Xiangfan City 0.38 5800
7 Yicheng City in Xiangfan City 0.19 3430
8 Urban district of Jingmen City 0.72 7990
9 Zhongxiang city of Jingmen City 0.48 6490
10 Shayang County of Jingmen City 0.24 3140
11 Hanchuan City of Xiaogan City 0.48 5500
12 Xiantao City 0.67 10880
13 Qianjiang City 0.19 2720
14 Tianmen City 0.57 4600
(1) Depreciable amount is equal to original price of fixed assets (each sewage treatment plant’s gross investment) minus
expected net salvage value.
(2) Yearly depreciation rate is equal to remaining service life divided by the sum of expected service life.
(3) Yearly depreciation amount is equal to depreciable amount multiplied by yearly depreciation rate.
TakingWuhan City as a case study to determine the fixed cost coefficient bi. During the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the gross
investment of all sewage treatment plants (the original price of fixed assets) in Wuhan City is 1953900000 Yuan. According
to 20 years operation period depreciation, we obtain the total depreciation amount of the fixed assets is 976950000 Yuan,
and the total value of fixed assets in 2010 is as follows
1953900000− 976950000 = 976950000 Yuan.
In addition, by the year of 2010, the total reduction amount of COD in Wuhan City is 186000× 5 = 930000 tons. Thus,
in 2010, the fixed cost coefficient b14 can be expressed by
b14 = The total value of fixed assets in 2010The total reduction amount of COD from 2006 to 2010
= 976950000
930000
= 1050 (Yuan/ton).
By using the samemethod above, we can calculate the other 13 fixed cost coefficients bi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 13, and the results
are listed in Table 2.
Further, by analyzing the statistical data of 14 counties’ and cities’ environmental protection ‘‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’’
and the environmental protection ‘‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’’ of Hubei Province, China, we obtain the following data:
(1) In 2005, 14 counties’ and cities’ actual total discharge amount of COD is 323750 tons, and the results are listed in Table 2.
(2) It is supposed that the total discharge amount is increasing with the annual growth rate of 4.5%. Based on this premise
and 14 counties’ and cities’ actual total discharge amount of COD in 2005, we can forecast the total discharge amount of
COD in 2010. The predicted results are listed in Table 2.
(3) By the year of 2010, the control objective of 14 counties’ and cities’ total permitted emission quantity of COD is
Q0 = 297500 tons.
For the variable costs coefficient ai, we must combine the integrated information of the current situation of every city’s
sewage treatment, actual expenditure of related organizations and the reform trend of administrative organization in the
following five years. However, these three factors are all uncertain. So it is difficult to obtain the accurate data for the
environmental management department. Thus, we can only approximately estimate the values of ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , 14. In
practice, we substitute the values of the fixed cost coefficient bi, controlling quantity q0i (the permitted pollution discharge
capacity) and predicted quantity Gi which are listed in Table 2 into the free allocation Model (M1):
Min
n−
i=1
[ai(Gi − q0i )2 + bi(Gi − q0i )]
s.t.

n−
i=1
q0i = Q0
ai(Gi − q0i )+ bi = p, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
By solving this model, we can obtain the values of the variable costs coefficient ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , 14. The results are listed
in Table 2.
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Table 2
Allocation results of COD in 2010.
Number City (or
Country)
Actual
discharge
amount in 2005
(104 ton)
Controlling
quantity in
2010 q0i (10
4
ton)
Predicted
discharge
amount in 2010
Gi (104 ton)
Declared marginal cost parameters Allocated
quantity in
2010 (104 ton)
ai (Yuan/ ton2) bi (Yuan/ ton)
1 Shiyan 2.550 2.100 3.178 0.082 610 1.539
2 Danjiangkou 1.130 1.070 1.408 0.113 933 0.504
3 Xiangfan 2.994 2.720 3.731 0.068 562 1.684
4 Laohekou 0.514 0.488 0.640 0.192 731 0.003
5 Gucheng 0.402 0.382 0.501 0.136 1518 0.180
6 Yicheng 0.510 0.485 0.636 0.089 1511 0.138
7 Jingmen 1.620 1.560 2.019 0.102 1011 1.095
8 Zhongxiang 1.110 1.060 1.383 0.112 1349 0.843
9 Shayang 0.610 0.580 0.760 0.122 1112 0.069
10 Tianmen 1.680 1.540 2.094 0.101 809 0.960
11 Xiantao 0.970 1.400 1.209 0.125 1417 0.779
12 Qianjiang 0.800 0.800 0.997 0.131 1228 0.442
13 Hanchuan 0.617 0.595 0.769 0.128 1137 0.131
14 Wuhan 16.850 14.970 20.998 0.048 1050 19.115
Total amount 32.375 29.750 40.323 Equilibrium price 227.482p∗ = 1953.9 Yuan/ton
6.2. Validity evaluation for free allocation results of COD in 2010
Substituting related data listed in Table 2 into Model (M3). By solving Model (M3), we obtain the optimal total allocated
quantity Q ∗ = 274820 tons in 2010, and the 14 counties’ and cities’ allocated quantity qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 14 are listed in
Table 2.
The final quantity Q ∗ = 274820 tons of COD by usingModel (M3) is the valid allocation part of the free allocation results.
The difference value Q0 − Q ∗ = 22680 tons is the invalid allocation part of the free allocation results. So we have
(1) The validity degree of the free allocation is
H = Q
∗
Q0
× 100% = 27.482
29.750
× 100% = 92.3%.
(2) The invalid degree of the free allocation is
H = (Q0 − Q
∗)
Q0
× 100% = 2.268
29.75
× 100% = 7.7%.
In fact, the parameters in declared marginal cost functions gi(x) = aix+ bi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 14 given in Table 2 are not the
results of direct andperfect competition, but only as a reference factor tomake an environmental planning. There are obvious
differences in the polluters’ bidding because of the regional difference, personnel difference and technique difference. In
addition, the TPPDC is not allocated by a kind of completely competitive methods such as auction in practice, but by using
the multi-objective approaches (such as regional and industry support, the protection of key region, economic capacity,
the local environmental sustainability, etc.) to consider the feasibility and fairness of allocation. Further, when making
the environmental planning, the environmental management department will take some measures, such as performance
evaluation, environmental compliance assessment, priority allocation of environmental funds, bank loans of construction
funds, information disclosure and public supervision. Due to these measures, the invalid degree of the free allocation
method is only 7.7%. Therefore, if the environmental management department entirely allocates the actual quantity Q0 =
297500 tons of COD to the 14 polluters, then the allocation results are of high credibility and good effectiveness.
In practice, if we use the uniform price auction method based on elastic supply given by (M3) to allocate TPPDC, once
the polluters observe the optimal allocating capacity Q ∗ < Q0, they will adjust their bids until Q ∗ = Q0, and their declared
information will be closer to the true information. Thus, the new allocation results are more valid than the results listed in
Table 2.
7. Conclusions
This paper studies the problem of allocating TPPDC, and proposes an evaluationmodel to evaluate the validity of the free
allocation scheme by using the theories and methods of operations research (OR). Based on the uniform price auction of
divisible goods, we proved that this evaluationmodel has some good properties, such as stimulation of information, validity
of allocation, consistency of bidding, and so on. So we conclude that this auction mechanism can be used to allocate TPPDC,
and then can be directly used to evaluate the validity degree for the free allocation of TPPDC. In addition, in order to further
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illustrate the feasibility and reasonableness of this evaluation model, we apply this model to the validity evaluation of free
allocation scheme of COD in the environmental planning of Han River basin, and get satisfied results.
Our validity evaluation model is not only used to evaluate the validity for the free allocation, but also as a universally
applicable new paid allocation method for auctioning and allocating the TPPDC. However, because of the complexity of
practical problems, the imbalance in regional development and the various support policies for different regions and
different sectors, it is unrealistic to allocate the COD completely on the basis of the results of this paid allocation method.
These allocation results are only regarded as a reference for pollution charge or evaluating the credibility of environmental
planning.
The results of this paper are of some application values for effectively implementing the total amount control of pollutants
and improving the pollution discharge declaration system. They also have certain theoretical significance for improving the
auction mechanism design and the bilateral strategy optimization.
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